Essays on financial markets and macroeconomic activities by Mok, Junghwan
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2014
Essays on financial markets and
macroeconomic activities
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/15286
Boston University
 
 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
JUNGHWAN MOK 
 
 
B.A., Yonsei University, 2007 
M.A., Boston University, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2014 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ©  Copyright by 
  JUNGHWAN MOK 
  2014  
 
 
 
 
Approved by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Reader _______________________________________________   
  Simon Gilchrist, Ph.D. 
  Professor of Economics 
 
 
 
 
Second Reader _______________________________________________  
  Francois Gourio, Ph.D. 
  Research Economist 
  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
 
 
 
 
Third Reader ________________________________________________  
  Alisdair Mckay, Ph.D. 
  Assistant Professor of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
DEDICATION 
 
I dedicate this dissertation to God. This dissertation would not have been possible without 
God having it in his plan for me. “But he knows the way that I take; when he has tested 
me, I will come forth as gold.” (Job 23:10) 
 
I dedicate this dissertation to my loving wife Yunjung Kim, my son Eunchan Mok, and 
my parents for undying devotion, relentless support, and encouragement in helping me 
fulfill this aspiration. Throughout this education journey, I have had the loving and 
unconditional support of my family. My family has supported me both financially and 
spiritually with prayers, encouraging words that gave me strength to make this dream a 
reality.  
 
 
  
v 
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND  
MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
 (Order No.                    ) 
JUNGHWAN MOK 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2014 
Major Professor: Simon Gilchrist, Professor of Economics 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three papers addressing different aspects of financial 
markets and macroeconomic activities. 
Firm Risks, Credit, and Labor Market Fluctuations studies the effect of changes in 
firm risks on the cyclical properties of the labor market. I develop a general equilibrium 
model in which the adjustment of employment is costly. Financial frictions arise from the 
limited liability property of the contract between lenders and firms. The changes in firm 
risks alter the amount of debt that firms can borrow to finance their working capital. This 
mechanism amplifies labor market fluctuations and displays a countercyclical external 
finance premium, consistent with the empirical evidence. 
Shadow Banks and Stabilization Policies studies the interaction between 
commercial banks and shadow banks and the effect of stabilization policies. I develop a 
general equilibrium model in which the shadow banks obtain loans from commercial 
banks in the form of short-term collateralized debt. The moral hazard creates volatile 
leverage of shadow banks, which makes the economy more vulnerable to economic 
vi 
shocks. Upon an aggregate disturbance, a stabilization policy in the form of direct 
lending is relatively more efficient than policies aimed at the shadow-banking sector. 
Bank Capital and Lending: An Analysis of Commercial Banks in the United States 
empirically evaluates the impact of bank capital on lending patterns of commercial banks 
in the United States. Using two different measures of capital, namely the capital adequacy 
ratio and tier 1 ratio, we find a moderate relationship between bank equity and lending. We 
also use an innovative instrumental variables methodology that helps us overcome the 
endogeneity issues that are common in such analyses. 
 
Contents
1 Firm Risk, Credit, and Labor Market Fluctuations 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Labor Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 Household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.3 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.4 Wage Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.1 Functional Forms and Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.2 Impulse Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.3 Business Cycle Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 Shadow Banks and Stabilization Policies 24
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.1 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.2 Commercial Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.3 Shadow Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2.4 Capital Good Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.5 Household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.6 Aggregation and Market Clearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3.1 Calibration and Steady State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3.2 Impulse Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4 Stabilization Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
vii
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Bank Capital and Lending: An Analysis of Commercial Banks in
the United States 50
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3 Data and Stylized Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 The Empirical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4.1 Endogeneity Issues and IV Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5 Regression Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Appendix A Nash Wage Bargaining 66
Appendix B Data Description and Regression Tables 68
Bibliography 71
Curriculum Vitae 74
viii
List of Tables
1.1 Functional Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2 Value of Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Business Cycle Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 Business Cycle Statistics with one shock at a time . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1 Value of Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 IV Regression (Adding Controls Sequentially) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Main IV Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4 First Stage Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
ix
List of Figures
1.1 Impulse response of selected aggregate, labor market, and financial
market variables in response to a one-time negative shock to aggregate
TFP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1 Impulse Reponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2 Impulse response of selected variables in response to a one-time nega-
tive shock to aggregate TFP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.1 Asset and Leverage Growth (1963-2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Asset and Leverage Growth (Pre & Post Basel) . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
B.1 Distributions of the Capital Adequacy Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
B.2 Distributions of the Tier 1 Capital Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.3 Distribution of the Equity-to-Asset Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.4 Time Series of Key Variables (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B.5 Time Series of Key Variables (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
x
List of Abbreviations
ABS Asset-Backed Security
AR Auto Regressive
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio
CES Center for Economic Studies
CPP Capital Purchase Program
CRS Constant Return to Scale
Corr. Correlation
DSGE Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
ECB European Central Bank
FRED Federal Reserve Economic Data
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HPI House Price Index
i.i.d Independent and Identically Distributed
IV Instrumental Variable
NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
SIC Standard Industrial Classification
Std. Standard Deviation
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program
TFP Total Factor Productivity
xi
1Chapter 1
Firm Risk, Credit, and Labor Market Fluctuations
1.1 Introduction
With the onset of the recent financial crisis in 2007, the link between financial mar-
kets and real economic activities have drawn the attention of many scholars and
policy-makers. A high unemployment rate was one of the outcomes of the crisis. To
understand this phenomenon, one needs a macroeconomic model which focuses on la-
bor market dynamics. However, relative to other aspects of macroeconomics, models
related to unemployment are scarce.
The most well-known model is the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and
matching model of equilibrium unemployment. It abstracts from the flexible labor
market and introduces a costly adjustment of employment. However, Shimer (2005)
points out that this model fails to match the volatility and persistence of unemploy-
ment, vacancies, and market tightness. Subsequent research tries to explain what key
factors are absent in the model in order to explain such mismatches.
One stream of literature has focused on the credit market frictions which create a
wedge between the factor prices and the marginal products. The time-varying wedge
generates amplified responses of hiring decisions to the aggregate shocks. Another
stream of literature points out that the wage determination though the Nash bargain-
ing model prevents the impact of aggregate shocks on labor market variables. The
Nash bargaining process allows wages to absorb the most of macroeconomic fluctua-
tions, so that workers’ and firms’ behaviors do not vary much. Thus, imposing wage
rigidity is expected to change the labor-related decisions.
This paper presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with both
labor and financial market frictions. This labor market model structure follows the
standard labor search and matching model. Hiring workers is a costly process, so
2firms consider not only the contemporaneous marginal products but also the future
expected value of additional workers.
In this model, the key difference arises from the financial market friction. Firms are
exposed to firm-specific idiosyncratic shocks every period, thus their realized output
is different from what they expect at the beginning of each period. However, they
are constrained by their working capital needs, so they make decisions about capital
demand and vacancy creation without knowing what their final outcome will be.
Their working capital constraints make firms vulnerable to default depending on the
realization of firm risk shocks. Knowing this, lenders are reluctant to provide credit,
they limit the size of working capital, and they ask for higher finance premiums.
However, even though the model incorporates frictions, the standard aggregate
TFP shock alone cannot generate enough volatility of labor market variables. If we
allow the time-varying distribution of firm-specific shocks, which we interpret as firm
risks, firms face even tighter financial conditions. Due to the limited liability property
of debt, higher firm risks (i.e. more dispersed distribution of shocks) incentivize firms
to use inferior substandard technology which produces lower mean output. Although
using inefficient technology gives lower mean returns compared to using standard
technology, the default option allows firms to enjoy only the upside risk and to transfer
their downside risks to lenders. With proper assumptions about the distribution, firm
risk shocks generate even more volatile responses compared to the model with the
aggregate TFP shocks only.
This paper is closely related to recent literature that has attempted to resolve
the inability of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1987) model to account for the un-
employment fluctuation observed in the data. Chugh (2013) studies the spillover
effect of idiosyncratic shocks on the average level of aggregate TFP shock. Similar
to the "output model" in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), Chugh’s model incorporates
the asymmetric information problem. He shows that the spillover effect strengthens
the financial friction and leads to more volatile fluctuations of labor market variables.
3Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) also focuses on the asymmetric information and shows that
the monitoring cost shocks may amplify the responses. Garin (2014) incorporates
the working capital constraint as did Jermann and Quadrini (2000), in which the
movement of collateral values alters the capacity of firms to raise funds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model
structure. Section 1.3 presents the calibration and simulation results, and Section 1.4
concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Labor Market
There is a unit mass of workers in the economy. All workers are either employed or
unemployed.1 Let nt−1 denote the number of employed workers at the beginning of
period t. The employed workers supply labor inelastically to the entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur posts vacancies vt to recruit new workers. At the beginning of the period
t, ρx fraction of the employed workers are exogenously separated from their jobs. The
separated workers join the pool of job seekers immediately. Thus, the total number
of job searchers in period t is:
ut = 1− (1− ρx)nt−1 (1.1)
Job matches are obtained from a Cobb-Douglas matching technology m(ut, vt).
Once the job match is formed, the existing workers and newly hired workers partici-
pate in production in the same period. With all the ingredients in place, the law of
motion for aggregate employment can be written as:
nt = (1− ρx)nt−1 +m(ut, vt) (1.2)
1It means that full participation is assumed.
4For later use, one can define the probability of finding a job pt, and filling a
vacancy qt as follows:
p(θt) =
m(ut, vt)
ut
(1.3)
q(θt) =
m(ut, vt)
vt
(1.4)
where θt ≡ vt/ut represents the labor market tightness from the firms’ perspective.
The relevant unemployment statistics of the model that is comparable to data is
u˜t = 1− nt (1.5)
where u˜t denotes the measured unemployment. It corresponds to the number of
workers who are not producing at time t.
1.2.2 Household
There is a representative household in the economy and it is composed of a continuum
of measure one of family members.2 Every member of the household is either employed
or searching for jobs. As is common in many DSGE search models since Merz (1995)
and Andolfatto (1996), there is perfect risk-sharing among members of household to
ensure the same level of consumption regardless of employment status.
The household maximizes its expected lifetime discounted utility
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ct)− ψnt]
subject to a sequence of flow budget constraint
ct + kht+1 + Tt = wtnt + kht (1 + rt − δ) + s(1− nt) + Πt. (1.6)
2I use the terms "workers" and "family members" interchangeably.
5where I impose a linearity in nt. This assumption gives a constant marginal disu-
tility of work ψ. The household’s discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1), u(·) is standard
strictly-increasing and strictly-concave utility function over consumption, ct is house-
hold consumption, nt is the measure of members who are employed at time t. The
employed members receive wage income wt and the unemployed receive the unem-
ployment benefit s from the government which is financed through the lump-sum
tax Tt. In addition to choosing consumption, the household can rent in capital kht+1,
earning the market rental rate rt+1 in the following period. δ is the depreciation rate
of capital stock and Πt is the dividends payments from firms.
The optimal choice of the household is characterized by the standard Euler equa-
tion:
u′(ct) = βEt [u′(ct+1)(1 + rt+1 − δ)] (1.7)
For the purpose of wage bargaining that will be discussed shortly, it is useful to write
down the value of an employed and an unemployed worker to the household. Let the
HN,t and HU,t denote the value of an employed worker and an unemployed worker at
time t respectively. The value of an employed worker is:
HN,t = −ψ + u′(ct)wt + βEt [(1− ρx + ρxf(θt+1))HU,t+1 + ρx(1− f(θt+1))HN,t+1](1.8)
1.2.3 Firms
A continuum of unit mass firm uses the constant return-to-scale production technol-
ogy to produce output in the economy. Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity.
Firm j’s production function can be written as:
yjt = ωjtztkαjtn1−αjt
6where ωjt is the firm-specific productivity realization, zt is the level of total factor
productivity (TFP), kjt is firm’s purchase of physical capital on the spot markets,
and njt is the number of employed worker for the production in period t. The TFP
level is common to all firms and evolves according to
lnzt = ρzlnzt−1 + εzt
where εzt ∼ N (0, σz) and σz is the standard deviation of the innovation. ωjt is a
random variable, i.i.d across firms and time, drawn from a distribution function F(ω)
with a positive support, E(ω) = 1 and a time-varying standard deviation σt. For later
use, let F (ω;σt) ≡ Ft(ω) denote the cumulative distribution function of firm-specific
shocks. This time-varying standard deviation will be called firm risks.
I model the firm sector in the economy by drawing on the framework by Chugh
(2013). Within this framework, firms are owned by households and maximize the
expected present discounted value of dividends paid out to households. Firm j’s
dividends payment is composed of two components: a non-retained earnings Πejt and
an expected operating profit EωΠfjt, where Eω indicates an expectation conditional
on the period t aggregate state but before idiosyncratic shocks are realized. The
superscript "e" represents an entrepreneur who accumulates capital and borrows funds
from outside lenders, while the superscript "f" represents a firm which is specialized in
the production. Thus, the total dividends payment to households is Πjt = Πejt+EωΠ
f
jt.
The intertemporal objective function of firm j can be expressed as:
E0
∞∑
t=0
γtΛt|0
[
Πejt + EωΠ
f
jt
]
where γ < 1 is introduced to ensure that firms cannot accumulate capital to avoid
financial constraints. By adding γ to the discount factor, firms are assumed to be
more impatient than households.
7Firm Financing
Firms are assumed to be required to raise funds before production due to a cash-
flow mismatch. Therefore, I follow the recent literature by assuming that firms face
working capital needs that have to be satisfied by obtaining an intra-period loan to
cover the total operating cost of production. As demonstrated in Chugh (2013) and
Garin (2014), payments to workers, capital rental costs, and hiring costs have to be
accounted for before the realization of revenues. Let Mjt denote the total operating
cost, then
Mjt = wtnjt + rtkjt + %(vjt) (1.9)
where %(vjt) is the vacancy posting cost in terms of output goods, which can be linear,
concave, or convex depending on whether the marginal cost of vacancy postings is
constant, diminishing, or increasing.
As mentioned above, due to the firms’ impatience, firms should finance a part of
their operating costs by borrowing from lenders. The rest of costs are covered with
their own accumulated net worth, which is held primarily in the form of capital. Firm
j’s capital holdings at the beginning of the period t are kejt. They are rented on the
spot market to other firms, earning (1 + rt − δ), like households rent their capital on
the spot market. This capital stock kejt is related to the non-retained earnings, which
reflects the firm’s savings decision. It is different from kjt, which reflects the firm’s
capital demand decisions for production purposes. Thus, firm j’s net worth can be
written as:
nwjt = kejt(1 + rt − δ) + et (1.10)
where et is the amount of small ’start-up’ funds transferred from households which
allow bankrupted firms to continue their operation. Thus, the total borrowing by the
8firm in period t is Bjt = Mjt − nwjt.
Capital Demand and Vacancy Creation
In this section, I focus on the expected operating profit components. Given certain
financial conditions, the firm maximizes the expected operating profit
Max
kjt,vjt,njt
Eω
[
ωjtztk
α
jtn
1−α
jt − χt (wtnjt + rtkjt + %(vit))
]
(1.11)
subject to the working capital constraint (1.9) and the law of motion for employment
(2.25), where χt > 1 is a "markup" on input costs that arises solely from the external
financing needs of the firm.3 It reflects the shadow value of the working capital to
the firm.4 Thus, for each unit of rented capital, wage payment and vacancy costs,
the operating cost is multiplied by χt. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) interpret χt as
a "markup" that drives a wedge between factor prices and marginal products, while
Chugh (2013) interprets it as an external finance premium. Both interpretations can
be applied to this model.
For the optimization conditions, I drop all j subscripts because I analyze a sym-
metric equilibrium across all firms. Also, since all decisions are made before the
realization of idiosyncratic shocks, ωjt is not shown in the optimization conditions.5
Maximizing (1.11) with respect to capital rental kt gives the capital demand condition:
rt =
αztk
α−1
t n
1−α
t
χt
(1.12)
This condition shows that the marginal product of capital is no longer equal to the
rental rate, but is equal to the rate including the financing cost.
When firm j decides its vacancy posting, it takes as given the probability that a
3If there was no idiosyncratic shock, I would have χt = 1 for all t, which means that financing
issues are irrelevant.
4Precisely, χt = 1 + χ˜t where χ˜t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the working capital constraint.
5This is due to the assumption E(ω) = 1.
9vacancy will be filled q(θt). Thus, maximizing (1.11) with respect to vacancy postings
vjt and employment njt gives the vacancy creation condition:
%′(vt)χt
q(θt)
= (1− α)ztkαt n−αt − χtwt + (1− ρx)γEtΛt+1|t
%′(vt+1)χt+1
q(θt+1)
(1.13)
Condition (1.13) equates the marginal cost of posting a vacancy with its discounted
expected value of marginal benefit from the marginal job match net of wages. The
marginal benefit is composed of the contemporaneous marginal product of labor and
the value of a worker who is hired in period t and continues to work in period t +
1. Note that in the absence of financial frictions, the working capital constraint
disappears and χt becomes 1. The vacancy creation condition in a standard DSGE
search model is a particular case of (1.13) with χt = 1:
%′(vt)
q(θt)
= (1− α)ztkαt n−αt − wt + (1− ρx)γEtΛt+1|t
%′(vt+1)
q(θt+1)
(1.14)
Financial Contract
Regarding the form of borrowing, firms borrows from lenders by means of collateral-
ized risky debt contracts. Under the contract, at the beginning of the period t, firm
j borrows Bjt using its output as collateral and agrees to pay back at a non-state-
contingent price B¯jt at the end of period t, i.e after the production. When making
a contract in period t, both the firm and lender are not aware of the realization of
idiosyncratic shocks, but they are aware of the aggregate state (zt, σt).
The firm j’s output is ωj,tχtMi,t. Once the idiosyncratic shock is realized, there is
a cutoff threshold where the firm cannot pay its debt. Let ω¯t denote the threshold,
then
ω¯t =
B¯j,t
χtMjt
(1.15)
If ωjt ≥ ω¯t the firm honors its debt. If ωjt ≤ ω¯t the firm defaults and the lender simply
10
keeps the collateral which is the output ωj,tχtMi,t. Note that all firms, regardless of
whether they default or not, do produce output up to their full capacity.
When borrowing from the lender, each firm faces two constraints. First, a partic-
ipation constraint requires that the lender is willing to fund the firm. Since the loan
is an intra-temporal loan, the opportunity cost to lend is the same as the amount of
debt. Therefore, the participation constraint takes the form:
χtMjt
[∫ ω¯jt
ωjtdFt(ω) + ω¯jt [1− Ft(ω¯jt)]
]
≥Mjt − nwjt (1.16)
Second, the lender imposes an incentive compatibility (IC) constraint due to the
moral hazard problem. To introduce a moral hazard problem, I modified the mod-
els of Adrian and Shin (2013) and Nuno and Thomas (2013). A firm is assumed to
have the option to use one of two different technologies: a standard technology and a
substandard technology. These technologies differ only in the distribution of idiosyn-
cratic realization, given by Ft(ω) and F˜t(ω) ≡ F˜ (ω;σt) respectively. The substandard
technology has a lower average payoff,
∫
ωdF˜t(ω) <
∫
ωdFt(ω) = 1, and is thus ineffi-
cient. Moreover, Ft(ω) is assumed to first-order stochastically dominate F˜t(ω), which
means that F˜t(ω) > Ft(ω) for all ω > 0. Therefore, the substandard technology has a
higher downside risk. In order to induce the firm to use the standard technology, the
lender should guarantee that standard technology brings higher returns to the firms
than substandard technology. The IC constraint takes the following form:
∫
ω¯jt
(
ωjtχtMjt − B¯jt
)
dFt(ω) ≥
∫
ω¯jt
(
ωjtχtMjt − B¯jt
)
dF˜t(ω) (1.17)
Equation (1.17) requires a deeper analysis. The expected payoff of using the standard
technology can be expressed as:
∫
ω¯jt
(
ωjtχtMjt − B¯jt
)
dFt(ω) = χtMjt
∫
ω¯jt
(ωjt − ω¯jt) dFt(ω) (1.18)
11
The integral part of the right hand side represents the value of a call option on the
returns with strike price equal to the default threshold ω¯jt. The limited liability arises
from this non-state-contingent debt payment. Thus, the firm enjoys the upside risk
in output over and above its debt, but does not bear the downside risk, which is
transferred to the lender. We can rewrite the value of the call option as:
∫
ω¯jt
(ωjt − ω¯jt) dFt(ω) =
∫
ωdFt(ω) +
∫ ω¯jt
(ω¯jt − ω) dFt(ω)− ω¯jt (1.19)
Given the face value of its debt, the firm’s expected net profit increases with (1) mean
of idiosyncratic shock
∫
ωF (ω) , and (2) the value of the put option on the return
with strike price ω¯jt. Denote pit(ω¯jt) as the put option value, then
pit(ω¯jt) ≡ pit(ω¯jt;σt) =
∫ ω¯jt
(ω¯jt − ω) dFt(ω) (1.20)
Analogously, the put option value under the substandard technology, which is denoted
by p¯it(ω¯jt), is defined my a similar pattern, but with F˜t replacing Ft. The distribution
assumptions give p¯it(ω¯jt) > pit(ω¯jt).6 Denote ∆pit(ω¯jt) ≡ p¯it(ω¯jt)−pit(ω¯jt) as the differ-
ence between two put option values, and then we have ∆pit(ω¯jt) = F˜t(ω¯jt)−Ft(ω¯jt) >
0, which shows that the incentive to use substandard technology increases with the
debt commitment. Intuitively, when choosing between two different technologies, the
firm trades off the higher mean return of using the standard technology against the
lower put option value.
Asset Accumulation and Dynamic Profit Function
Based on the financial contract above, the firm makes a savings decision. The firm j
starts period t with net worth given by (1.10). Then it borrows Mjt − nwjt against
the value of these assets, and it expects to keep
[∫
ω¯jt
(ωjt − ω¯jt) dFt−1(ω)
]
χtMjt af-
6By integrating by part, it is possible to show that pit(ω¯jt) =
∫ ω¯jt Ft(ω)dw. First-order stochastic
dominance assumption of Ft over F˜t implies the second-order dominance:
∫ x
F˜t(ω)dω >
∫ x
Ft(ω)dω
for all x > 0. Thus, p¯it(ω¯jt) > pit(ω¯jt) for all ω¯jt > 0
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ter repaying its loan. The firm can either accumulate assets or make payment to
households, that is
Πejt + ket+1 =
[∫
ω¯jt
(ωjt − ω¯jt) dFt(ω)
]
χtMjt (1.21)
= [1− ω¯jt + pit(ω¯jt)]χtMjt (1.22)
If the participation constraint (1.16) binds, the asset accumulation equation can be
written as
Πejt + ket+1 =
χt [1− ω¯jt + pit(ω¯jt)]
1− χt [ω¯jt − pit(ω¯jt)]nwjt
= χt [1− ω¯jt + pit(ω¯jt)]1− χt [ω¯jt − pit(ω¯jt)]
(
kejt(1 + rt − δ) + et
)
where the last equation comes from the definition of net worth (1.10).
With all variables in place we can conclude that the firm j’s dynamic profit func-
tion can be written as
E0
∞∑
t=0
γtΛt|0
[
Πejt + EωΠ
f
jt
]
(1.23)
where
Πejt =
χt [1− ω¯jt + pit(ω¯jt)]
1− χt [ω¯jt − pit(ω¯jt)]
(
kejt(1 + rt − δ) + et
)
− ket+1
EωΠfjt = Eω
[
ωjtztk
α
jtn
1−α
jt − χt (wtnjt + rtkjt + %(vit))
]
Thus, the maximization of (1.23) with respect to the asset accumulation ket+1 gives
the firm’s capital Euler equation:
1 = γEt
[
Λt+1|t
χt+1 [1− ω¯jt+1 + pit+1(ω¯jt+1)]
1− χt+1 [ω¯jt+1 − pit+1(ω¯jt+1)] (1 + rt+1 − δ)
]
(1.24)
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1.2.4 Wage Bargaining
As is common in the labor search literature, the wage-determination mechanism is
Nash bargaining between workers and firms. The wages of all workers, whether newly
hired or not, are set each period through Nash negotiation, which implies that the
cost associated with the recruiting procedure is paid before negotiation takes place.
The detailed derivation of the wage-bargaining problem is presented in Appendix.
Let η ∈ (0, 1) be a worker’s bargaining power and 1−η a firm’s bargaining power.
Then the wage is determined by
wt =
η
χt
[
(1− α)zt
(
kt
nt
)α
+ (1− ρx)γEtΛt+1|t%
′(vt+1)χt+1
q(θt+1)
]
+ (1− η)
[
φ
u′(ct)
+ s
]
− η
χt
(1− ρx)
[
EtΛt+1|t (1− p(θt+1)) %
′(vt+1)χt+1
q(θt+1)
]
(1.25)
The wage equation (1.25) shows that the wage is a convex combination of the expected
discounted value to the firms and workers. The first and the third terms represent
the value to the firm: marginal revenue generated for the firm by a new employment
match, deflated by the financing cost, and the forward-looking relationship value of
employment net of the value for newly matched workers. The second term represents
the value to the workers, the sum of marginal disutility and the unemployment benefit.
Note that in the absence of financial friction and γ = 1, the wage would collapse to
the wage equation in standard labor-search model
wt = η
[
(1− α)zt (kt/nt)α + (1− ρx)EtΛt+1|tθt+1%′(vt+1)
]
+ (1− η)
[
φ
u′(ct)
+ s
]
(1.26)
1.3 Quantitative Analysis
1.3.1 Functional Forms and Calibration
The functional forms for preferences, job match and vacancy costs are presented in
Table 1.1. All functional forms are commonly used in the literature.
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Functional Forms Description
u(ct) = ln(ct) Consumption Subutility
m(ut, vt) = m0uζt v1−ζt Job Matching Technology
%(vt) = %¯vκt Vacancy Creation Costs
Table 1.1: Functional Forms
The baseline values for parameters can be seen in Table 1.2. The households’
discount factor β is set to target an annual steady-state interest rate of 4% and the
entrepreneur’s additional discount γ = 0.947 is taken from Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1998). The parameter that governs the disutility of labor ψ is chosen to match
a steady-state unemployment rate of 10%. Several authors have argued that the
targeted steady-state unemployment rate should be higher than the rate of workers
counted as unemployed, as the model does not account for non-participation.7 It
can be interpreted as a sum of both unemployed and partially out of the labor force
workers. The unemployment benefit is chosen to match a replacement ratio s/w of
0.4, which is the lower spectrum of the values in the literature.8 The elasticity of
capital in the production function α is set to 0.36, while the quarterly depreciation
rate for capital δ is set to 2.5%. I assume an AR(1) process for the natural log of
the TFP, shocks to which have quarterly persistence ρz = 0.95 as in the standard
business cycle literature. The standard deviation is chosen to match the empirical
volatility of GDP.
For parameters pertaining to the labor market, the exogenous separation rate ρx
is set to 10%, which is consistent with the 0.034 monthly separation rate computed by
Shimer (2005) and is within the range of values used in the literature, ranging from
7Chugh (2013), Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) and Garin (2014) use the same 10% unemployment rate
for the calibration. Krause and Lubik (2007), Andofatto (1996) and Trigari (2009) use higher values,
12%, 43%, and 25.3%, respectively, while Gertler and Trigari (2009) use 7%.
8There is no definite value for the replacement ratio in the search literature. For example,
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) choose 0.955 to match key labor market statistics in standard
search model, which generates lower elasticity of a wage to productivity. Rotemberg (2006) uses a
value of 0.9, while Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) set the rate at a lower 0.75.
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Parameters Description Value
β Households’ subjective discount factor 0.99
γ Entrepreneurs’ (additional) subjective discount factor 0.947
ψ Disutility of Labor 0.5153
s Unemployment Benefit 0.8967
α Share of capital in the production function 0.36
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
ρx Job Seperation rate 0.1
m0 Matching function calibrating parameter 0.6529
ζ Elasticity of matches w.r.t unemployment 0.5
η Worker’s Nash bargaining power 0.4
%¯ Vacancy cost calibrating parameter 0.2136
κ Curvature of vacancy creation cost function 1
ρz Persistence of aggregate productivity 0.95
ρσ Persistence of risk shocks 0.9457
σz Standard deviation of productivity shock 0.0079
σσ Standard deviation of risk shock 0.0465
υ Standard deviation of substandard technology 1.43
ν Mean of substandard technology 0.0002
σ Steady-state firm-risk volatility 0.0373
Table 1.2: Value of Parameters
0.07 in Merz (1995) to 0.15 in Andolfatto (1996). The matching function parameter
m0 is chosen to match a job-filling rate q(θ) of 0.9. The elasticity of matches with
respect to unemployment is standard in the literature, and the worker’s bargaining
power is taken from Chugh (2013). I assume a linear vacancy cost function i.e. κ = 1,
and the cost of posting vacancy %¯ is chosen so that the steady-state vacancy cost
represents 0.65% of output (%(v)/y = 0.65%), corresponding to Garin (2014).
The model-specific parameters are calibrated according to the strategy of Nuno
and Thomas (2013). I target a spread in the short-term debt of 25 annualized basis
points. Thus, the gross interest rate is equal to R¯ = R(1.0025)1/4. This implies a
default threshold ω¯ = B¯
B
φ−1
φ
= 0.5292
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The firm-specific shocks are assumed to be log-normally distributed as
ln ω ∼ i.i.dN
(−σ2t
2 , σ
2
t
)
ln ω˜ ∼ i.i.dN
(−υσ2t − ν
2 ,
√
υσ2t
)
both for the standard and substandard technologies, respectively. Both ν and υ
control the mean and variance difference between two technologies. These distribu-
tion assumptions give E [ω˜] = e−ν/2 < E [ω] = 1, F (ω;σt) = Φ
(
log(ω)+σ2/2
σt
)
, and
F˜ (ω;σt) = Φ
(
log(ω)+ ν+υσ
2
t
2√
υσt
)
. The standard deviation of firm risk shocks is also as-
sumed to follow AR(1) process in logs.
log(σt) = ρσlog(σt−1) + (1− ρσ)log(σ) + εσt , εσt ∼ i.i.d N (0, σσ)
The parameters governing the dynamics for firm risk shocks are calibrated using the
TFP series for all 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries constructed by the NBER
and the US Census Bureau’s Center for Economic Studies (CES)9. I calculate the
cross-sectional standard deviation series of the industry-level TFP series in the log
deviations from a linear trend. Then, I convert it into quarterly frequency and derive
the persistence and standard deviation of the series. I set ν to 0.002 for analytic
purposes and solve for υ = 1.43. Shocks to the substandard technology are
√
υ = 1.2
times more volatile than shocks to the standard one.
1.3.2 Impulse Responses
In this section, I present results from impulse response analysis of one standard de-
viation shocks to aggregate TFP and to firm risks. The scale represents percentage
deviations (or log-deviations) from the steady state, except for the finance premium,
which represents percentage point deviations.
Figure 1.1 compares the responses of key variables to each shock and both shocks
at the same time. Following a negative TFP shock, firms reduce their hiring on im-
9Website: http://www.nber.org/data/nbprod2005.html
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Figure 1.1: Impulse response of selected aggregate, labor market, and financial market
variables in response to a one-time negative shock to aggregate TFP.
pact by 5%. Unemployment increases at the same time, consistent with the empirical
evidence of the Beveridge curve. The lower value of collateral leads to the nega-
tive response of investment and debt. As financial constraints tighten, firms should
postpone new recruitment.
Firm risk shocks amplify the responses of all labor market variables while they
subdue those of output and investment. As the dispersion of the idiosyncratic shocks
increases, lenders are reluctant to lend funds to firms. Due to the high risk of defaults,
lenders ask for the higher finance premium which generates larger negative responses
of vacancy postings. Since the risk shocks do not affect the mean of productivity
directly, the aggregate production is less affected than in the case of TFP shocks.
If both TFP shocks and risk shocks hit the economy at the same time, we see the
reinforcement of responses.
1.3.3 Business Cycle Statistics
Table 1.3 compares standard business cycle statistics from Hodrick-Prescott filtered
data with their counterparts from the model’s simulations. Model simulation series
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Data (1951Q1-2013Q2)
GDP Unemployment Vacancy Market Tightness Investment
Std. (%) 1.5600 13.1267 14.0551 26.5871 6.9091
y 1.0000 -0.8527 0.8990 0.8963 0.8857
Corr. u 1.0000 -0.9133 -0.9766 -0.7253
Matrix v 1.0000 0.9796 0.8200
θ 1.0000 0.7916
i 1.0000
Model Simulation
GDP Unemployment Vacancy Market Tightness Investment
Std. (%) 1.5600 9.8259 18.0444 26.1108 4.6070
y 1.0000 -0.8511 0.5682 0.7130 0.9913
Corr. u 1.0000 -0.7321 -0.8823 -0.8665
Matrix v 1.0000 0.9666 0.5657
θ 1.0000 0.7170
i 1.0000
Table 1.3: Business Cycle Statistics
are generated by simulating the model 5000 times around the deterministic steady
state equilibrium. Each simulation is a length of 1000 periods, and we abandon the
first 200 observations in order to abstract from the sensitivity to initial values. All
moments are calculated from the log-deviation of each series filtered by a Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter 1600. Then, I choose the mean of the
statistics across the simulation.
Data shows that the labor market statistics are much more volatile than output
and investment. Unlike the standard labor search model, the baseline model matches
the empirical moments fairly well. Unemployment and vacancy are roughly 6.3 times
and 11.6 times more volatile than output, respectively. Although it fails to gener-
ate enough unemployment fluctuation and over-generates vacancy fluctuations, its
performance is superior to other existing literature. Using a costly state verification
problem, Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) presents a model that generates 2.37 times more
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Model with only TFP shocks
GDP Unemployment Vacancy Market Tightness Investment
Std. (%) 1.4691 6.7875 7.4602 13.4507 4.2619
y 1.0000 -0.9370 0.8897 0.9663 0.9929
Corr. u 1.0000 -0.7820 -0.9383 -0.9342
Matrix v 1.0000 0.9493 0.9067
θ 1.0000 0.9743
i 1.0000
Model with only risk shocks
GDP Unemployment Vacancy Market Tightness Investment
Std. (%) 0.4994 7.0894 16.4655 22.4072 1.6677
y 1.0000 -0.9980 0.7601 0.8743 0.9879
Corr. u 1.0000 -0.7741 -0.8852 -0.9864
Matrix v 1.0000 0.9797 0.6596
θ 1.0000 0.7968
i 1.0000
Table 1.4: Business Cycle Statistics with one shock at a time
volatile unemployment and 8.95 times more volatile vacancy than output. In Garin
(2013), the introduction of collateral constraint produces an unemployment that is
3.8 times and 6 times more volatile than output, respectively. Chugh (2013) uses the
spillover effect between the aggregate TFP and idiosyncratic productivity to generate
the ratio of the standard deviation of unemployment to that of output, which equals
8.63. However, the model in Chugh (2013) has an endogenous job searching decision
for workers, which is absent in this model. Regarding the correlation, the model
presented here also captures the strong negative relationship between vacancies and
unemployment observed in the data.
To understand how much the risk shocks contribute to the generation of such
fluctuations, I simulate the model with one shock at a time. Table 1.4 represents
the same statistics generated by each shock. It is clear that the risk shocks amplify
labor market variables much more than the aggregate TFP shocks. Meanwhile, the
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model with only TFP shocks does well in matching the statistics related to output
and investment. Intuitively, the risk shocks determine the external financing cost
of firms and in turn, affect the hiring decision. Thus, risk shocks contribute to the
movement of labor market variables. The aggregate TFP shock directly affects the
real (non-financial) sector of the economy.
1.4 Conclusion
I have developed a model in which shocks to the firm risk generate large fluctuations in
labor markets, and the amplification is mediated through the short-term collateralized
debt contract. This model is suitable to study how firms’ financing conditions affect
the decisions about job creation. Relative to the standard DSGE labor search model,
this model performs well in matching the movements of key labor market variables.
The key features of the model are the risk shocks and the financial frictions.
Financial frictions arise from the limited liability and the moral hazard property of
the contract between lenders and firms. The higher dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks
leads to the higher risk of defaults, which discourages lenders from providing loans to
firms. It generates a counter-cyclical finance premium, consistent with the empirical
evidence. Financially constrained firms postpone new recruitment and it becomes
more difficult for unemployed workers to find jobs.
Several extensions can be made for future research. As this model focuses on
the demand side of labor market, a different model may allow for endogenous job
searching or endogenous job separation. Chugh (2013) and den Haan, Ramey, and
Watson (2000) already have introduced such features in their work in order to explain
many business cycle issues. Also, introducing active financial sector institutions may
contribute details to the financial frictions. Wasmer and Weil (2004) presented a
three-period model in which a bank is the intermediary between workers and firms.
One can extend this idea into a DSGE model that includes a banking sector that
actively manages its balance sheet and, in turn, affects the financial condition of
21
firms.
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Chapter 2
Shadow Banks and Stabilization Policies
2.1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 financial crisis motivated many scholars and policy makers to investi-
gate the causes and consequences of financial market disruption. This has led to an
increase in both empirical and theoretical research that focuses on the vulnerability
of financial markets and the connections among financial intermediaries.
After the 1990s, the shadow banking sector emerged and grew rapidly. Shadow
banks are relatively free from regulatory supervision and rely on short-term debt.
They take many of the same risks as traditional or commercial banks, but with
far less capital. Thus, the shadow banking sector’s excessive leverage increase may
contribute to the financial instability and the substantial contraction of the financial
markets.
This paper analyzes the interaction between commercial and shadow banks in sit-
uations where two types of banks are interconnected. I develop a general equilibrium
model with financial intermediates who play a key role in supplying credit to firms.
As the shadow bank is exposed to the uncertainty risk, the limited liability property
of the debt may lead to an increase in macroeconomic volatility. Last, I suggest
that government policy in the form of direct lending is relatively more efficient than
policies aimed at the shadow banking sector.
The basic structure of the model can be summarized as follows. Shadow banks
borrow from commercial banks in the form of short-term risky debt. Unlike commer-
cial banks, shadow banks are segmented with firms across islands. When firms are
hit by the island-specific idiosyncratic shocks, shadow banks are also exposed to these
shocks. Depending on the realization of shocks, a fraction of shadow banks declare
bankruptcy and default on their debt in each period.
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The shadow banks’ leverage is endogenously determined by market forces. Due to
the limited liability, they enjoy the upside risk in their assets over and above the face
value, leaving commercial banks to bear the downside risk. This possibility creates a
moral hazard problem, so commercial banks impose a leverage constraint in order to
induce shadow banks to invest efficiently.
On the other hand, commercial banks can raise deposits from households. They
can either give loans directly to firms or purchase ABS from shadow banks. Commer-
cial banks have an incentive to invest in ABS, because securitized assets, which are
regarded as safer and more liquid and tradeable, are more pledgeable than the loans
they have in their balance sheet. Thus, by holding good quality collateral, commercial
banks can increase their leverages.
Although increased securitization helps the extend the credit supply, it also creates
a vulnerability as the supply of ABS depends on the shadow banks’ balance sheet. A
negative aggregate shock has an impact on both sets of banks’ net worth. The fall of
shadow banks’ net worth leads to a contraction in shadow banking activity. In turn,
this further tightens the financing constraints of commercial banks, which results in
the amplified responses of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model
structure. Section 2.3 presents the calibration and simulation results, Section 2.4
performs policy analysis, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
The model economy consists of five types of agents: a representative household,
commercial banks, shadow banks, firms, and capital good producers. We can divide
the model framework into the real side and the financial side. The real side of the
model is standard. Firms borrow funds from banks to purchase capital from capital
producers. Using capital and labor, firms produce a final good, which is purchased
by households for consumption and by capital producers. After production, firms sell
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the depreciated capital to capital producers and transfer operating profits to banks.
The financial side of the model is composed of two sectors: commercial banks and
shadow banks. We assume that the household lacks the skills necessary to manage
financial investment projects. As a result, both banks are the only entities that can fi-
nance a firm’s investment and are efficient at evaluating and monitoring firms. These
two types of banks are different in several ways. First, commercial banks can raise
deposits directly from households, while shadow banks cannot. Thus, shadow banks
borrow funds from commercial banks in the form of short-term debt. Second, com-
mercial banks are assumed to be under regulatory supervision, so their loan provisions
are limited to the standard firms. The definition of ’standard’ firms will be explained
below. However, shadow banks can freely choose to give loans to ’substandard’ firms.
Third, idiosyncratic uncertainty risks exists across sectors, or islands. Shadow banks
are exposed to the risks, so they can default if the realized shock is bad enough.
Commercial banks are safe from default, because they have superior technology to
diversify risks. On the other hand, commercial banks are financially constrained. As
explained in Gertler and Karadi (2011), commercial banks cannot raise deposits from
households infinitely because they may divert assets for their benefit. Thus, they
need to pledge a portion of their assets to raise deposits. Meanwhile, due to the
uncertainty and the limited liability, the shadow banks have an incentive to invest
in inferior projects and shift downside risks to the creditor commercial banks. The
commercial banks cap the leverage of shadow banks in order to prevent the moral
hazard.
We now analyze the behavior of each type of agents.
2.2.1 Firms
A continuum of competitive firms produces final goods. As in Kiyotaki and Moore
(2008) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), we assume that firms are segmented across
a continuum of "islands" indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Firms in island j start a period with
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capital Kjt which is purchased at the end of period t − 1. In the beginning of the
period, each island faces an idiosyncratic shock, ωjt , which changes the amount of
effective capital to ωjtKjt . The shock ωjt is i.i.d. over time and across islands.
Following Nuno and Thomas (2013), in each island there exist two types of firms
which differ in the shock distribution they face. In every period after production has
taken place, each firm’s type follows an i.i.d. process over time, with probability one
half each. Note that the type for time t is drawn at the end of t−1. As described above,
at the beginning of period t, they faces idiosyncratic shocks to effective capital. Let ωjt
and ω˜jt denote the shock received by each type of firm "standard" and "substandard"
firms, respectively. Both shocks are i.i.d. over time and across islands. Let F (ωt;σt−1)
and F˜ (ωt;σt−1) denote the cumulative distribution functions in period t respectively,
where σt−1 is the exogenous process that governs the variance of both distributions and
is known one period in advance. The average shock to standard firms is normalized
to 1, i.e
∫
ωdFt(ω) = 1.
The role of the two different types of firms will be discussed in Section 2.2.3, when
we describe the structure of shadow banking sector. Note that, in equilibrium the
substandard firms do not operate and only standard firms produce output. Thus,
"firms" refers to standard firms only, unless otherwise indicated.
Firms produce goods using capital and labor in a constant-return-to-scale Cobb-
Douglas technology,
Y jt = Zt(ωjtKjt )α(Ljt)1−α (2.1)
where Zt is an exogenous total factor productivity (TFP) process. Firms choose labor
to satisfy:
Wt = (1− α) Y
j
t
Ljt
= (1− α)Zt
(
ωjtK
j
t
Ljt
)α
(2.2)
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It follows that the effective capital-labor ratio is equalized across the island for all j,
ωjtK
j
t
Ljt
=
(
Wt
(1− α)Zt
)1/α
The firm’s operating profits are given to Y jt − WtLjt = Zt(ωjtKt)αL1−αt − WtLjt =
ωjtR
k
tK
j
t where
Rkt = αZt
(
(1− α)Zt
Wt
) 1−α
α
(2.3)
is also equalized across the islands. Once the production is done, firms sell the
depreciated capital (1− δ)ωjtKjt to capital producer at price Qt. Summing together,
we can express the total return from the effective capital as
RAt =
Rkt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume that firms can only buy capital
through issuing state-contingent debt. At the end of period t − 1, the firm buys
Kjt unit of new capital for the production in period t. To finance this, firms issue a
number Ajt−1 of claims on the gains in period t. Firms face the funding constraint at
the end of period t − 1, QtKjt = QtAjt−1, where Qt is the price of capital. Thus, the
payment for claims can be thought of as dividends from firms to lending banks.
2.2.2 Commercial Banks
The structure of commercial banks is a modified version of the banking sector modeled
in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Meek et al. (2013). Within this framework, there
exists a continuum of commercial banks (mnemonic c) in the economy, which are
owned by household. They have two investment options: (1) financing firms in the
form of equity-like state-contingent debt, Act (2) buying asset backed securities issued
by shadow banks, Bct . Their portfolio is financed by a mix of deposits and inside
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equity (net worth). However, commercial banks face an agency problem because they
cannot pledge the entire value of their assets to raise deposits from households. A
shortage of pledgeable income is the source of the financial frictions in the economy.
Recall that our assumptions about commercial banks guarantee that they give
loans only to standard firms and are able to diversify risks across islands. Commer-
cial banks provide a bundle of loans across the islands, i.e Act =
∫
Ac,jt dj. Thus, a
continuum of commercial banks can be considered as a representative commercial
bank. The balance sheet identity of the representative commercial bank at the end
of the period t is given by:
QtA
c
t +Bct = Dt +N ct (2.4)
where Dt is the deposits raised from household, and N ct is the net worth of the
commercial bank.
Let RBt be the return from the ABS and Rt be the deposit rate. Then, net worth
at time t is the retained earnings from assets funded at t− 1, net borrowing costs, as
follows:
N ct = RAt Qt−1Act−1 +RBt Bct−1 −RtDt−1 (2.5)
and using the balance sheet condition (2.4), we can re-write (2.5) as follows:
N ct = (RAt −RBt )Qt−1Act−1 + (RBt −Rt)Dt−1 +RBt N ct−1 (2.6)
A commercial bank maximizes its expected discount terminal net worth V ct by
choosing the amount of assets to purchase and deposits to borrow:
V ct = max
Act ,B
c
t ,Dt
EtΛt+1|t
[
(1− θ)N ct+1 + θV ct+1
]
(2.7)
where Λt+1|t is the household’s stochastic discount factor and θ is the survival rate of
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the bank. As discussed in next paragraph, banks are constrained to raise funds due to
an agency problem. To prevent banks from avoiding the constraint by accumulating
sufficient net worth, it is assumed that each period banks exit the market with the
probability θ and transfer their earnings back to households upon exit. Thus, only
1− θ fraction of the banks survive and can operate in the next period.
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), I introduce a moral hazard problem between
households and banks, which limits the size of bank’s balance sheet. At the end of each
period, banks may choose to divert κ fraction of all available funds from the projects
and transfer it back to the households. If a bank diverts its funds, then depositors
are able to force the banks into bankruptcy and recover the remaining 1− κ fraction
of the assets. It is assumed that depositors cannot recover the diverted fraction of
assets due to the high cost. We assume that the depositors regard balance sheet loans
as worse collateral than asset backed securities. Thus, the value of divertible assets is
a weighted fraction of the bank’s end of period balance sheet value. To ensure banks
do not have incentive to divert funds, the following incentive compatibility constraint
must be satisfied at the end of period t:
V ct ≥ κ (QtAct + (1− γ)Bct ) (2.8)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] and ABS becomes perfectly pledgeable as γ is close to 1. Switching
a marginal unit of funds from loans into ABS reduces the divertible assets by κγ and
loosens the constraint. As Meek et al. (2013) discussed, the motivation behind (2.8)
is that whereas loans held by banks are opaque, ABS are standardized, tradable, and
backed by collateral.1
The commercial bank will maximize its expected return to its portfolio subject
to the incentive compatibility constraint (2.8). Then, its demand for assets is fully
1Perotti (2010) suggests that the change in bankruptcy provisions led banks to demand ABS
for its collateral value. Between 1998 and 2005, a series of amendments to bankruptcy laws in the
United States and European Union led to exemption from bankruptcy stays for all secured financial
credit used in repurchase agreements.
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determined by its net worth position, and it will expand its balance sheet until the
incentive compatibility constraint binds.
The value of a commercial bank V ct can be expressed as follows:
V ct =
(
νAt
Qt
− νBt
)
QtA
c
t +
(
νBt − νDt
)
Dt + νBt N ct (2.9)
where νAt , νBt , and νDt are the marginal value of an additional unit of each balance
sheet item at the end of period t: loans, deposits, and net worth, respectively. Let
the λct be the multiplier on the constraint (2.9), then the first-order conditions for
optimal Act , Dt, and λct are:
νAt
Qt
− νBt = κγ
λct
1 + λct
(2.10)
νBt − νDt = κ(1− γ)
λct
1 + λct
(2.11)
0 =
(
νAt
Qt
− νBt − κγ
)
QtA
c
t +
(
νBt − νDt − κ(1− γ)
)
Dt
+
(
νBt − κ(1− γ)
)
N ct (2.12)
According to the equation (2.10), the marginal value of loans in terms of good
νAt
Qt
exceeds the marginal value of ABS to the extent that the incentive constraint is
binding (λct > 0) and the ABS is pledgeable (γ > 0). Combining the conditions with
the equation (2.4), we can derive the bank’s ABS demand function:
Bct =
1
γ
Dt −
(
νAt /Qt − κ
κγ − µct
)
N ct (2.13)
where µct
(
≡ νAt
Qt
− νBt
)
is the excess value of loans over ABS. The equation (2.13) shows
that the demand for ABS is increasing in deposits and decreasing in net worth. A
higher proportion of deposits leads banks to hold more ABS as the incentive constraint
tightens, while a higher proportion of net worth increases the capacity of the bank to
hold more loans.
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The equation (2.10) gives an equation for the Lagrange multiplier:
λct =
µct
κγ − µct
(2.14)
We can see that λct represents the effect of relaxing the constraint by a marginal unit.
One unit of goods can be leveraged into additional 1/(κγ − µct) unit of loans, which
increases bank’s value by µct per unit. As λct gets larger, it is more attractive for
banks to hold loans, but banks are limited in expanding their balance sheet due to
the incentive constraint.
Let the Ωt be the marginal value of net worth at period t. Then after combining
the value function (2.9) with the Bellman equation (2.7), we can verify the value
function is linear in Act , Bct , and Dt if µct , νBt , and νDt satisfy:
µct = EtΛt+1|tΩt+1
[
RAt+1 −RBt+1
]
(2.15)
νBt = EtΛt+1|tΩt+1RBt+1 (2.16)
νDt = EtΛt+1|tΩt+1Rt+1 (2.17)
with
Ωt+1 = 1− θ + θ
(
νAt
Qt
+ λct(
νAt
Qt
− κ)
)
(2.18)
The intuition behind the determination of Ωt+1 is the following: The bank exits and
consumes its net worth with probability 1 − θ. The net worth of a surviving bank
increases its value by νAt /Qt directly, since there is no cost for internal equity. On
the other hand, the marginal unit of net worth relaxes the incentive constraint by
(νAt /Qt − κ) and increases the value of banks by λct .
For later use, it is useful to derive the relationship between the excess return on
loans over ABS and ABS over deposit. Combining the first-order conditions (2.10)
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and (2.11) with (2.15)-(2.17) gives the following equation:
EtΛt+1|t
[
RBt+1 −RDt+1
]
=
(
1− γ
γ
)
EtΛt+1|t
[
RAt+1 −RBt+1
]
(2.19)
2.2.3 Shadow Banks
There is a representative shadow bank in each island which can only operate within
the island. At the end of period t− 1, the shadow bank (mnemonic s) j borrows Bs,jt
from commercial banks and promises to pay back a non-state-contingent amount B¯jt
at the beginning of period t. Here the claims on the proceeds from shadow bank assets
are used as collateral. Thus, this debt can be interpreted as asset-backed security.
Like commercial banks, shadow banks finance firms in the form of equity-like state-
contingent debt. But, unlike commercial banks, they are exposed to the island-specific
idiosyncratic shocks. After the realization of idiosyncratic shock across islands, the
shadow bank repays its debt to commercial banks. Depending on the realization,
there exists a default threshold which equals the face value of debt, B¯jt−1 and the
proceeds from asset, ωjtRAt Qt−1A
s,j
t−1, where As,jt−1 is the amount of loans that shadow
banks made. The default threshold can be expressed as,
ω¯jt ≡
B¯jt−1
RAt Qt−1A
s,j
t−1
(2.20)
If ωjt ≥ ω¯jt , the shadow bank honors its debt and keep the rest. If ωjt < ω¯jt , the
shadow bank defaults and the commercial bank seizes the shadow bank’s assets and
liquidates the proceeds.
The shadow bank is financially constrained due to the moral hazard problem,
which will be discussed shortly. Thus, to avoid the financial constraint, the shadow
bank may find it optimal to accumulate its earnings to the point where the constraint
is no longer binding. Like commercial banks, there is an exogenous random exit
probability, 1 − θ. Upon exiting, the shadow bank pays retained earnings to the
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household, which can be thought as dividends payment.
The surviving banks are assumed to not raise outside equity. This implies the
existence of a non-negativity constraint on dividends
ωjtR
A
t Qt−1A
s,j
t−1 − B¯jt−1 −N s,jt ≥ 0 (2.21)
where N s,jt is the net worth after the dividend.
Based on the realization of idiosyncratic shock, the shadow bank decides how much
net worth to hold. Then, shadow banks decide the size of liability Bs,jt to purchase
the claims As,jt subject to the balance sheet constraint: QtAs,jt = Bs,jt +N s,jt .
The shadow bank faces two financial constraints when borrowing from commercial
banks. The first constraint is a participation constraint. The expected payoff to the
commercial banks should exceed the expected payoff from the opportunity cost of
lending. The participation constraint can be written as
EtΛt,t+1
[
RAt+1QtA
s,j
t
∫ ω¯jt+1
ωdFt(ω) + B¯jt
[
1− Ft(ω¯jt+1)
]]
≥ EtΛt,t+1
[
(1− γ)RAt+1 + γRt+1
] [
As,jt −N s,jt
]
(2.22)
where the second line is derived from (2.19) and the balance sheet identity.
The second constraint is an incentive compatibility constraint from the moral
hazard problem. We assume that, once the shadow bank has received the funding, it
may choose to invest in either of the two firm types within its island. As explained
in Section 2.2.1, these two types differ in the distribution of island-specific shocks.
I assume that the distribution of island specific (substandard) shock ω˜jt first order
stochastically dominates that of (standard) shock ωjt , i.e F˜ (ωjt ;σt−1) > F (ωjt ;σt−1)
for all ωjt . Based on the distribution of shocks, it turns out that the substandard
technology has a lower average return
∫
ωdF˜ (ω;σt−1) <
∫
ωdF (ω;σt−1) = 1, and thus
is inefficient. The moral hazard problem arises from the possibility of banks investing
in ’substandard’ technology.
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When lending money to shadow banks, the commercial banks do not want shadow
banks to invest in substandard firms. Thus, the commercial banks should adjust the
face value of debt to guarantee the higher expected payoff to shadow banks when
they invest in the standard type firm. Let Vt+1(ω,As,jt , B¯jt ) denote the value function
in period t + 1 of a continuing shadow bank. Then, the incentive constraint can be
written as
EtΛt,t+1
∫
ω¯jt+1
[
θVt+1
(
ωjt+1, A
s,j
t , B¯
j
t
)
+ (1− θ)
(
ωjt+1R
A
t+1QtA
s,j
t − B¯jt
)]
dFt(ω)
≥ EtΛt,t+1
∫
ω¯jt+1
[
θVt+1
(
ωjt+1, A
s,j
t , B¯
j
t
)
+ (1− θ)
(
ωjt+1R
A
t+1QtA
s,j
t − B¯jt
)]
dF˜t(ω) (2.23)
It is important to understand the shadow bank’s incentive to invest in one firm or the
other. The expected net payoff from investing the standard firm in the period t + 1
can be expressed by
[∫
ω¯t+1(ω − ω¯jt+1)dFt(ω)
]
RAt+1QtA
s,j
t . We can interpret the first
integral as the call option value on island-specific return with the strike price equal
to the default threshold ω¯t+1, which in turn equals the ratio of face value of debt to
asset, B¯jt /RAt+1QtA
s,j
t . This means that the shadow bank enjoys the upside risk in the
asset return above the face value of debt due to the limited liability. On the other
hand, the downside risk is transferred to the creditor, the commercial banks, and the
shadow bank does not bear any risk lower than the face value of debt.
We can rewrite the value of call option as
∫
ω¯t+1
(ω − ω¯jt+1)dFt(ω) =
∫
ωdFt(ω)− ω¯jt+1 +
∫ ω¯t+1
(ω¯t+1 − ω)dFt(ω)
Notice that the last integral represents the value of put option on the returns with
strike price ω¯t+1. Denote the value of put option as
pi(ω¯t+1;σt) ≡
∫ ω¯t+1
(ω¯t+1 − ω)dFt(ω) (2.24)
Comparing the expected net payoff from investing in either type of firm, we can
find that the difference between the mean return and put option value determines the
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shadow bank’s decision. Our distribution assumption implies p˜i(ω¯t+1;σt) > pi(ω¯t+1;σt)
holds always. Recall that the mean return from substandard firm is always lower
than that of standard firm, i.e
∫
ωdF˜t(ω) <
∫
ωdFt(ω). Therefore, the shadow bank
compares the higher mean return of investing in standard firms with the lower put
option value.
Define ∆pit(·) ≡ p˜it(·) − pit(·) as the difference in put option. Our distribution
assumption implies that ∆pit(ω¯t+1) = F˜t(ω¯jt+1) − Ft(ω¯jt+1) > 0, which means that
the higher level of debt burden relative to assets increases the incentive to invest in
substandard firms. In order to discourage shadow banks from investing in substandard
firms, the commercial banks will refrain from asking for a too high face value of debt
relative to collateralized asset value.
Now I will describe the bank’s maximization problem. Let V (ωjt , As,jt , B¯jt ) denote
the value function of a non-defaulting shadow bank in the beginning of time t.
V (ωjt , As,jt , B¯jt ) = max
Nt
[
ωjtR
A
t QtA
s,j
t−1 − B¯jt−1 −N s,jt + J(N s,jt )
]
subject to (2.21), where J(N s,jt ) denotes the value of the shadow bank after paying
out dividends.
J(N s,jt ) = max
As,jt ,B¯
j
t
EtΛt,t+1
∫
ω¯jt+1
[
θVt+1
(
ωjt+1, A
s,j
t , B¯
j
t
)
+ (1− θ)
(
ωjt+1R
A
t+1QtA
s,j
t − B¯jt
)]
dFt(ω)
subject to (2.20), (2.23), and (2.22).
The solution of bank’s problem gives three equations which determines shadow
bank’s decision on N jt , As,jt , and B¯jt . It is required for the model parameters to satisfy
0 < βRA − 1 < (1 − θ)βRA ∫ω¯(ω − ω¯)dF (ω), where RA and ω¯ are the steady-state
value of RAt and ω¯t. Let b¯
j
t ≡ B¯jt /As,jt denote the ratio of the face value of debt to the
shadow bank’s assets. Then,
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• Optiamlly, the shadow bank does not pay dividends and retains all earnings,
N jt =
(
ωjt −
b¯t−1
RAt
)
RAt Qt−1A
s,j
t−1 (2.25)
where b¯t−1 is equalized across islands, such that ω¯jt = ω¯t = b¯t−1RAt
• The IC constraint holds with equality. In equilibrium, IC constraint can be
written as
1−
∫
ωF˜t(ω) = Et
[
Λt,t+1RAt+1(θR¯Bt+1λt+1 + 1− θ)
EtΛt,t+1RAt+1(θR¯Bt+1λt+1 + 1− θ)
[
p˜i
(
b¯t
RAt+1
;σt
)
− pi
(
b¯t
RAt+1
;σt
)]]
(2.26)
where λt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier to participation constraint, which is
equalized across islands.
• The participation constraint also holds with equality,
Ajt =
1
1− EtΛt,t+1RAt+1 [ω¯t − pi(ω¯t+1;σt)] /R¯Bt
N jt ≡ φN jt (2.27)
where R¯Bt = EtΛt+1|t
[
(1− γ)RAt+1 + γRt+1
]
is the expected discounted opportunity
cost of lending.
According to (2.25), the shadow bank will retain all earnings because of the pos-
sible financial distress, and the ratio of face value of debt to asset size is the same
across the islands. This implies that there is one default threshold which applies
to all shadow banks. The equation (2.26) pins down b¯t by equating the gain in the
average return with the loss in put option values from investing in the standard firm.
The equation (2.27) shows that all shadow banks have the same leverage ratio to
determine the demand of assets. The increase of left-tail risk increases the put option
value, which makes the commercial banks able to bear more down-side risks. Thus,
commercial banks will impose a tighter leverage constraint.
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2.2.4 Capital Good Producers
There is a continuum of competitive capital producers who produce capital goods by
combining the input of final goods and a CRS adjustment technology. At the end
of the period t, capital producers buy capital from final good producers and then
repair depreciated capital and build new capital. Used capital is transformed into
new capital on a one-to-one basis, while the price of new capital is Qt. Following
Christiano et al. (2003) and Smets and Wouter (2007), I assume that there is a
convex investment adjustment cost and model the investment problem as follows,
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtΛt+1|t
QtIt − It − χ¯2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
It

Capital producers maximize profits by equating the price of new capital with their
marginal cost, which gives rise to an upward-sloping supply function:
Qt = 1 +
χ¯
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
+ χ¯
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
− χ¯EtΛt+1|t
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2
(2.28)
2.2.5 Household
There is a continuum of identical households. Each household is composed of a
contingent of workers who supply labor, bankers who manage commercial banks, and
brokers who manage shadow banks. Each household member consumes a final goods
(Ct) and enjoys perfect consumption insurance with the other members. Over time,
a member can switch between the occupations. In every period, a fixed proportion of
households become bankers or brokers. They manage their institutions until exiting
the industry at random. Upon exit, they pay all of their retained earnings back to
household as dividends payment. Workers supply labor to firms and return the wages
they earn to households.
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The representative household has a utility function
E0Σ∞t=0βt [u(Ct)− v(Lt)] = E0Σ∞t=0βt
[
ln(Ct − hCt−1)− χ1 + ϕL
1+ς
t
]
subject to the budget constraint
Ct +Dt = WtLt +RtDt−1 + Πt
where Ct is consumption, Dt is deposit, Lt is labor supply, Wt is wage, and Πt is the
lump-sum dividend payment from both financial and non-financial firms. Households’
claim on firms, or capital stock, is held indirectly through the financial system, either
as deposits, or equity stakes in the financial institutions they manage. The first order
conditions are standard as follows:
EtΛt,t+1Rt+1 = 1
v′(Lt)/u′(Ct) = Wt
2.2.6 Aggregation and Market Clearing
Aggregate net worth of commercial banks at the end of period t is the sum of the net
worth of continuing banks and new banks. Assume that households supply a fraction
of τ c of total assets of commercial banks to new banks every period. Then, the law
of motion for commercial banks’ net worth is:
N ct = θ(RAt Qt−1Act−1 +RBt Bct−1 −RtDt−1) + (1− θ)τ c(Qt−1Act−1 +Bct−1) (2.29)
Similarly, aggregating across islands, aggregate net worth of shadow banks can be
written as:
N st = θ
∫
ω¯t
(ω − ω¯jt )dFt−1(ω)RAt Qt−1Ast−1 + (1− θ [1− Ft−1(ω¯t)]) τ sQt−1Ast−1 (2.30)
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where τ s is the fraction of household transfer to banks which are exited exogenously
or defaulted, and Ast =
∫
As,jt dj is the total assets of shadow banks.
Market clearing condition for capital requires that total demand by firms equals
total supply of capital producers,
∫ 1
0 K
j
t dj = Kt. The aggregate capital stock evolves
as Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It. The total issuance of state-contingent claims by firms must
equal total demands by both commercial and shadow banks:
Kt+1 = Act + Ast
Aggregating firms’ labor demand derived from (2.2), we have the labor market
clearing condition:
∫ 1
0
Ljtdj =
(
(1− α)Zt
Wt
)1/α ∫ 1
0
ωjKjt dj
=
(
(1− α)Zt
Wt
)1/α
Kt = Lt
where the second line uses the fact that ωj and Kjt are independently distributed.
With conditions above, aggregate supply of the final good by firms are:
Yt =
∫ 1
0
Y jt dj = Zt
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α ∫ 1
0
ωjKjt dj = ZtKαt L1−αt
Finally, the total supply of final good must equal consumption demand by households
and investment demand by capital producers
Yt = Ct + It + +
χ¯
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
It
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2.3 Quantitative Analysis
2.3.1 Calibration and Steady State
We calibrate model to the main features of a financial system roughly comparable to
that of the U.S. economy. The baseline values for parameters are shown in Table 2.1.
The parameters fall into two groups. The parameters in the first group are standard
in the real business cycle literature, while those in the second group are particular to
this model.
The households’ discount factor β is set to target an annual steady-state interest
rate of 4%. Disutility of labor χ is set to match the labor supply 1/3 and the elasticity
of labor supply is chosen in line with other macroeconomic studies. Conventional
values are used for the capital share α, and the depreciation rate δ, and the habit
persistence h.
The model-specific parameters are calibrated according to the strategy of Meek et
al. (2013) and Nuno and Thomas (2013). I target the gross financial spread RA −R
to 100 basis points, which is roughly equal to the spread between the yields on long-
term corporate and government bonds. The steady state ABS spread RB − R is set
to 50 basis points. The spread in the short-term debt is set to 250 annualized basis
points, so that the gross interest rate is equal to R¯ = R(1.025)1/4. This implies a
default threshold ω¯ = b¯φ−1
φ
= 0.9564
I set the survival probability of banks θ to 0.75, which implies that banks pay
dividends once a year on average. Then, I use (2.29) and (2.30) to solve for τ c = 0.0356
and τ s = 0.0064. For the benchmark model, I set the divertibility of ABS to 0.95,
meaning ABS is regarded as good collateral.
The firm-specific shocks are assumed to be log-normally distributed as
ln ω ∼ i.i.dN
(−σ2t
2 , σ
2
t
)
ln ω˜ ∼ i.i.dN
(−ησ2t − ψ
2 ,
√
ησ2t
)
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Parameters Description Value
β Households’ subjective discount factor 0.99
χ Disutility of Labor 11.12
ϕ Inverse labor supply elasticity 0.3
h Habit persistence in consumption 0.7
α Share of capital in the production function 0.36
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
θ Survival probability of banks 0.75
κ Divertibility of commercial bank assets 0.2648
τ c Fraction of assets transferred to new commercial banks 0.0356
τ s Fraction of assets transferred to new shadow banks 0.0064
γ Relative divertibility of ABS 0.95
ψ Mean of substandard technology 0.01
η Variance of substandard technology 1.5524
ρz Persistence of aggregate productivity 0.9
σz Standard deviation of productivity shock 0.01
ρσ Persistence of island-specific volatility shocks 0.9
σσ Standard deviation of island-specific volatility shock 0.05
Table 2.1: Value of Parameters
both for the standard and substandard technologies, respectively. Both ψ and η
control the mean and variance difference between two technologies. These distribu-
tion assumptions give E [ω˜] = e−ψ/2 < E [ω] = 1, F (ω;σt) = Φ
(
log(ω)+σ2/2
σt
)
, and
F˜ (ω;σt) = Φ
(
log(ω)+ψ+ησ
2
t
2√
ησt
)
. The standard deviation of firm risk shocks is also as-
sumed to follow AR(1) process in logs.
log(σt) = ρσlog(σt−1) + (1− ρσ)log(σ) + εσt , εσt ∼ i.i.d N (0, σσ)
I set ν to 0.01 for analytic purposes and solved for η = 1.5524. Shocks to the sub-
standard technology are √η = 1.246 times more volatile than shocks to the standard
one.
43
2.3.2 Impulse Responses
In this section, I present results from impulse response analysis of one standard de-
viation shocks to aggregate TFP. The scale represents percentage deviations (or log-
deviations) from the steady state, except for the loan-ABS spread, which represents
percentage point deviations.
Figure 2.1 shows the responses of key variables to the aggregate TFP shocks. Upon
a negative TFP shock, capital demand shifts inward followed by the drop in capital
prices and the expected return on capital increases. The fall in capital prices revalues
the balance sheet of both financial intermediaries, causing their net worth to decline.
The fall in commercial bank equity value increases the demand for ABS as shown
in (2.13), while the fall in shadow bank equity value decreases the supply of ABS as
shown in (2.27). For given RA, the opposing shifts in demand and supply lower the
ABS spread and the loan-ABS spread surges. On the other hand, for given RB, the
rise of expected return on capital relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint on
both banks. It reverses the shifts in demand and supply and lowers the loan-ABS
spread. However, as shown in Figure 2.1, it does not dominate the formal effect and
results in the increase of the spread.
The TFP shock has a different effect on each bank. Since shadow banks hold the
primary claims only, the fall in capital prices, triggered by the negative TFP shock,
directly affect the shadow banks’ net worth. Shadow bank net worth absorbs all losses
and undergoes a substantial contraction on the size of balance sheet. However, the
commercial banks’ net worth is partially protected and they are able to extend their
loan provisions, even when they demand less ABS.
Figure 2.1 also shows the different responses to different levels of bank assets’
divertibilities. I set γ = 0.95 for the high divertibility case and γ = 0.5 for the
low divertibility case. With the lower divertibility, ABS is less attractive for the
commercial banks, which triggers a substantial contraction compared to the high
divertibility case. The drop in ABS demand worsens the financial condition of the
44
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−1.4
−1.2
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Output
Time
%
 fr
om
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
Investment
Time
%
 fr
om
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Capital Price
Time
%
 fr
om
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−15
−10
−5
0
5
SB Assets
Time
%
 fr
om
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−25
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
SB Net Worth
Time
%
 fr
om
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−15
−10
−5
0
5
ABS
Time
%
 fr
om
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−1
0
1
2
3
4
CB Assets
Time
%
 fr
om
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
CB Net Worth
Time
%
 fr
om
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
SPAB
Time
pp
t f
ro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
 
 
High pledgeability
Low pledgeability
Figure 2.1: Impulse response of selected variables in response to a one-time negative
shock to aggregate TFP.
shadow banks. Thus, they contract their asset holdings even more and cannot recover
their net worth for long time.
2.4 Stabilization Policy
Based on the benchmark model, we can think of a crisis experiment in which the
uncertainty in the economy increases and the depositors do not regard bank assets
as good collateral. Although it abstracts from many other crisis phenomenons, it
captures the main idea that the collateral value of assets become impaired and people
were uncertain about the return on assets at the onset of the subprime crisis.
Suppose that there exists a representative government which has two options to
intervene in the market in order to stabilize the economy: (1) direct lending to firms
or (2) lending to shadow banks by purchasing ABS. These stabilization policies are
financed by issuance of government debt, which is held by households as a substitute
for bank deposits. Then, the government budget constraint takes the form:
Gt +QtAgt +Bgt +RtDgt−1 = Tt +Dgt +RAt Qt−1A
g
t−1 +RBt B
g
t−1 (2.31)
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where the superscript g denotes government holdings, Dgt is one-period government
bonds, and the lump sum taxes on households Tt adjusts to ensure the budget balance.
Rearranging the equation (2.31),
Gt − Tt = (RAt −RBt )Qt−1Agt−1 + (RBt −Rt)Bgt−1 (2.32)
I assume that there is a real resource cost associated with government policies, which
enables the government to impose a non-zero public expenditure, parameterized by
τ :
Gt = τ(Agt +Bgt )
The new market clearing conditions are:
Agt + Act + Ast = Kt+1
Bgt +Bct = Bst
Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2013), we can write
the government policies as a fraction of the total size of each asset. The policies take
the form of the feedback rule on the spread between the return on each asset and the
government bond. It captures the idea that the goal of the government policies is to
bring down the lending spread in funding markets. The policies can be written as:
ξAt = ξ¯A0 + ξ¯A1
[
Et(RAt+1 −Rt+1)− (RA −R)
]
(2.33)
ξBt = ξ¯B0 + ξ¯B1
[
Et(RBt+1 −Rt+1)− (RB −R)
]
(2.34)
where Agt = ξAt Kt+1 and B
g
t = ξBt Bst .
In the crisis simulation, consider an increase of uncertainty risk by 5% and a drop
in the divertibility of bank assets from 0.95 to 0.5. I set the resource cost of asset
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holdings τ to 0.002, as in Meek et al. (2013). The steady state fractions of government
asset holdings ξ¯A0 and ξ¯B0 are set to 2.5%, while the strength of the responses ξ¯A1 and
ξ¯B1 are set to 100.
Figure 2.2 compares the different responses of selected variables between govern-
ment policies. When the government actively participates in the direct lending mar-
ket, the immediate effects are the contraction in the commercial banks’ loan holdings
Act and the lower drop in the asset prices Qt compared to the no-policy case. The
dampened response of the asset value protects the bank net worth. However, unlike
the no-policy case, the bank net worth cannot be recovered immediately. The sta-
bilized funding market results in the lower spread, which makes bank profit growth
very slow. Thus, the net worth recovery remains low for a protracted period.
The government policy of purchasing ABS turns out to amplify the response of
output and investment, although it succeeds in lowering the spread and cushioning
the fall in asset prices. The main reason for this inefficient outcome is that the
incentive compatibility constraint of the shadow banking sector is unaffected by the
government policies. Even though the demand for ABS increases through government
intervention, the shadow bank cannot expand its balance sheet. Thus, the increase of
government ABS holdings is substituted by the decrease of commercial banks’ ABS
holdings. Meanwhile, the commercial banks cannot raise enough deposits because
households now have other options to save in government bonds. As seen in (2.13),
the reduction in deposits leads to lower ABS holdings. Combining these two negative
effects, commercial banks’ ABS holdings drop much more than in the other cases. To
clear the market, the loan-ABS spread must fall. In turn, this hurts the growth of
the net worth recovery.
It is shown that the direct lending policy helps to stabilize output, while the ABS
purchasing policy amplifies the fall in output. They have the same goal of supporting
asset prices, but the former turns out to be more effective.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse response of selected variables in response to a one-time negative
shock to aggregate TFP.
2.5 Conclusion
I present a general equilibrium model with two sectors of financial intermediaries
aimed at explaining the interaction between sectors. As the shadow banking sector
raises funds from the commercial banks, the credit supply and credit spread changes
depending on the health of each bank’s balance sheet. The shadow bank is modeled to
borrow in the form of short-term collateralized debt. In this case upon the aggregate
disturbance, the reaction of shadow banks is shown to be very volatile.
For the policy analysis, I compare two types of government stabilization policies
in the crisis experiment. With a higher uncertainty risk and lower pledgeable as-
sets, the credit supply and economic activity undergoes a downturn. I show that
direct government lending to firms is a relatively more effective tool than the indirect
intervention of purchasing ABS.
Several extensions can be made for future research. This model only focuses on a
partial segment of the shadow banking sector which only borrows from the commercial
banks. It would be more empirically consistent if one can extend the size of shadow
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banks’ balance sheet and the means of borrowing. Also, in order to analyze the effect
of government policies on shadow banks, one can alter the model to make the supply
of ABS be affected by government intervention.
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Chapter 3
Bank Capital and Lending: An Analysis of Commercial Banks in the
United States
3.1 Introduction
The effect of changes in bank capital on lending decisions is one of the primary deter-
minants of the linkage between financial conditions and real activity. This question
has gained much importance in the aftermath of the financial crisis. During the finan-
cial crisis, when the likelihood of a credit crunch was still under debate, the relation
between bank capital and bank lending was a key policy concern. Likewise, when the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) moved to inject capital into banks through
the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the impact of the program on real activity
largely focused on the effect of these injections on bank lending. More recently, this
question has re-emerged in light of proposals announced by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision to raise capital requirements for banks and limit leverage ratios.
In the aftermath of the 1990-91 recession, many observers debated whether the
newly introduced capital regulations along the Basel guidelines were hindering lend-
ing. Although this debate did not yield a consensus, it did result in the development
of empirical models that sought to quantify the effect of bank capital on bank lend-
ing.1 There are not many recent estimates for the U.S of the impact of changes in
bank capital on lending.
In this study, we ask how the bank capital ratio affects the lending decisions of
banks. Our sample only includes commercial banks. The data mainly comes from
the Call Reports database, maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Our
contribution in this paper is twofold. First, we quantify the relationship between bank
capital ratios and our measure of lending. Second, we contribute methodologically by
1For example, Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994), Berger and Udell (1994) and Bernanke and
Lown (1991), among others.
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proposing an innovative instrumenting technique that helps us address the problems
related to the simultaneous determination of capital and lending by banks. While our
estimates appear to be small, we are following the example of Berropside and Edge
(2010) in reconciling the small response of lending to capital For the benefit of the
reader, we reproduce their justification here.
The statements from the US Treasury suggested that a $1 increase in bank capital
leads to a $8 - $10 increase in lending capacity. These magnitudes are reasonable
once we make the assumption that banks actively manage their assets to maintain a
constant leverage. This view is based on a scatter plot from Adrian and Shin (2010).
We reproduce this figure below. The sample period used in Figure 3.1 is 1963 to
Figure 3.1: Asset and Leverage Growth (1963-2006)
2006, the same as that employed by Adrian and Shin. The constant leverage ratio
is apparent from the scatter plot. This suggests a very active management of assets
by commercial banks. This implies that any change in bank capital has a magnified
effect on assets with the scaling factor equal to the leverage ratio.
Now, how do we compare our regression results with the Adrian and Shin scatter
plots? We must acknowledge the major structural change that took place in the
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banking sector following the introduction of the 1989 Basel Banking Accord. Our
sample starts from 1996 while the Adrian and Shin sample starts from 1963. To find
out the effects of this choice of sample period on the analysis, consider Figure 3.2
below, from Berropside and Edge (2010).
Figure 3.2: Asset and Leverage Growth (Pre & Post Basel)
The left panel shows the relation between asset and leverage growth prior to Basel
(1963:Q1-1989:Q4) and this is consistent with Figure 3.1. The interesting part is the
right panel which plots data post-Basel i.e 1990:Q1-2008:Q3. As can be seen from
comparing these plots, the feature of the data that has led to the view that commercial
banks actively manage their assets to maintain constant leverage is much more of an
artifact of the early part of the sample and is considerably less evident in the latter
part. Indeed, in the latter part of the sample, there is no obvious correlation between
asset and leverage growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 surveys the literature,
Section 3.3 describes the dataset we use, Section 3.4 explains the empirical model,
variables and methodology, Section 3.5 presents the estimation results and Section
3.6 concludes. The graphs are placed in the Appendix B.
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3.2 Related Literature
The impact of bank capital on lending is one of the key questions that arises when
we explore macro-financial linkages. Hence, it is surprising that there are not many
recent estimates for the United States of the impact of changes in bank capital on
lending. In the aftermath of the 1990-91 recession, Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994)
estimated models relating changes in individual banks’ loan growth to measures of
loan demand and bank capital. They measure response of lending to excess/shortfall
of capital from a target ratio. Berger and Udell (1994) specified an equation relating
the growth rate of various bank assets to different measures of bank capital ratios.
Finally, Bernanke and Lown (1991) developed state-level equations linking bank loan
growth to bank capital ratios and employment for a single state (New Jersey).
If we look beyond the United States, there are some studies that seek to quan-
tify this relationship between bank equity and credit extension. Peek and Rosengren
(1995) and Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010) use loan applications from German Lan-
desbanks to examine the effect of shocks to capital on the supply of credit by compar-
ing the performance of affected and unaffected banks. Gianetti and Simonov (2010)
use Japanese data to perform a similar exercise concerning bank bailouts. These pa-
pers do find a relevant role for capital in determining loan volumes, although they
do not explicitly compare the magnitudes of the effects they find with those implied
by the constant leverage view. Another group of papers use firm and bank loan-level
data. These include Jimenez, Ongena, and Peydro (2010), who use Spanish data, and
Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010), who use data on Italy. These papers find sizable
effects of low bank capitalization and scarce liquidity on credit supply.
The papers using Spanish and Italian data find a larger value for the impact of
capital on loans. Santos and Winton (2013), using US loan level data (syndicated
loans), obtain relatively small effects of bank capital on lending. Also, Elliott (2010)
uses simulation based techniques to find small effects of capital ratios on loan pricing
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and loan volumes for U.S. banks. De Nicolo and Lucchetta (2010) use aggregate data
for the G-7 countries and conclude that credit demand shocks are the main drivers
of bank lending cycles.
3.3 Data and Stylized Facts
For this analysis we use an unbalanced panel of commercial banks’ balance sheet data.
Our data covers sixty quarters from 1996:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The data is obtained from
the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation requires all regulated financial institutions to file periodic information.
These data are maintained and published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.2
The appendix provides a detailed documentation of the data. Regulatory capital
requirements have undergone a few changes since their inception in the late 1980s.
In 1985-1986, banks had to hold primary capital exceeding 5.5% of assets. By the
end of the decade, this rose to 7%. Effective December 31, 1990, the banks were
required to hold a total capital of 7.25% as a fraction of risk weighted assets with
the Tier 1 capital being at least 3.25%. These ratios were further increased to 8%
and 4% following the implementation of Basel I in the end of 1992. From then on,
these ratios have remained fairly stable. We start the sample from 1996 to avoid such
sudden changes.
Table 3.1 gives the summary statistics of the data. We have 343,752 observations
on commercial banks in the United States. We ignore the top and bottom deciles.
To elaborate, we rank the banks by average size (measured by log of total assets)
over the sample period and then drop the top decile and bottom deciles. The reason
for adopting this strategy stems from our instrumenting methodology. We use the
real estate exposure of a bank times the change in real estate prices as an instrument
for bank capital. The land price change acts as the exogenous shock in our model.
2Historic data from 1976 to 2010 is available at the Chicago Federal Reserve website. Beginning
with the March 31, 2011, call reports are only available from the FFIEC Central Data Repository’s
Public Data Distribution site (PDD)
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All All All Big Big Big Small Small Small
variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
CAR .1540 .1357 .0629 .1495 .1326 .0587 .1704 .1492 .0737
LTA .6618 .6804 .1423 .6692 .6878 .1389 .6353 .6513 .1509
Tier 1 Cap .0944 .0877 .0285 .0925 .0865 .0268 .1015 .0933 .0329
LTAR .4728 .4787 .1691 .4905 .4978 .1641 .4087 .4013 .1712
LTANR .1890 .1692 .1197 .1786 .1589 .1166 .2266 .2101 .1231
%∆ LTAR .0052 .0034 .0602 .0046 .0034 .0567 .0069 .0035 .0711
%∆ LTANR -.0062 -.0077 .0931 .0046 .0033 .0567 -.0045 -.0061 .0984
%∆ HPI .0074 .0092 .0169 .0074 .0092 .0174 .0071 .0091 .0148
Liquidity 4.1156 4.1896 1.8572 4.6479 4.7361 1.8235 3.5333 3.6109 1.7135
Chargeoffs .2102 .1830 .1447 .2028 .1772 .1357 .2175 .1902 .1528
%∆ GDP .0064 .0067952 .0070901
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
The bigger banks in the US are sufficiently diversified and do not respond to local
land price changes in the same way as their medium-sized counterparts. The idea
behind dropping the smallest banks was that these banks show unusually high capital
ratios. This is because they have limited or no access to capital markets and retain a
substantial share of their earnings. Further, the smallest banks are extremely small
as a percentage of total bank assets and do not add to our analysis. We think that
it is only the relatively smaller/medium-sized banks that are more sensitive to local
land price movements. We only include banks that have a capital adequacy ratio less
than or equal to 25%. We also drop the banks if we find that the loan growth rate
exceeds 50% in a particular quarter. Having said that, it is indeed interesting to see
if there is a difference in behavior among banks of different sizes. As pointed out
earlier, we found a major difference in assets once we sorted banks and the contrast
was stark at the two points at which we truncated the data. Within the remaining
80% of banks, we divide them at the median and call them big and small for the rest
of the analysis. To make it explicit, hereon when we refer to "whole sample" we mean
the medium-sized banks. "Big" refers to the banks above the median in the sample
and "small" refers to those below the median.
As the table shows, we study two different measures of capital ratios, namely the
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and the Tier 1 capital ratio (Tier 1 Cap). We work
with a host of loan to asset ratios in this paper. The loan data we gather comprises
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loans made to the real estate sector, commercial and industrial loans, agricultural
loans and loans to households. LTANR shows the loan to assets ratio where we leave
out real estate loans and include the other three categories. LTAR is the loans made
to the real estate sector normalized by total assets. The mean real estate lending
as a fraction of total assets is about 47% which is quite substantial. The banks are
sufficiently exposed to the real estate sector, on average, and hence their bank capital
should be a lot more sensitive to real estate price movements.
The other variables we have are the growth in the house price index (gHPI).
It shows that on average the real estate prices have risen by about 7.4%, in the
sample period. This data was collected from the FRED database. The liquidity is
the securities that the bank holds at any given point in time divided by total assets.
Loans and securities are the two major components of the bank assets. Charge-offs are
a measure of risk in the banks balance sheet. They are simply the natural logarithm
of loan charge-offs in the given quarter. We use the GDP growth rate as a macro
control variable in the regression analysis and as a control for the demand size effects
that exist, as is common in the literature.
We now look at some stylized facts in the data. In our analysis, it is useful to
look at some of the key variables for the U.S. at four different points in time within
our sample. Figures B.1-B.3 show how the distribution of bank capital has changed
over time.3 It clearly shows that towards the end of the sample there are many more
banks who report low capital ratios. The mass to the left of the 10% capital ratio
level has increased irrespective of the measure of capital we use. Figures B.4 and B.5
show the time series of these variables. The grey bands show the NBER recession
dates. This helps us understand the behavior of these variables over time. It is clear
how the house prices and the bank capital fell dramatically during the recent financial
crisis. We show all three measures of bank capital ratio as discussed earlier.
3We also report the equity asset ratio here. It is defined as the common equity normalized by
total assets.
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3.4 The Empirical Framework
The empirical model we wish to estimate is the following:
LTANRsi,t = αi + νs + βKi,t + γ1BSCi,t−1 + γ2Macrot−1 + ui,t (3.1)
where
• LTANRsi,t is the loan to asset ratio of bank i at time t, with headquarters
located in state s. Here the loans are all the loans made by the bank except the
real estate loans. To elaborate on this point a little more, the loans included in
this variable are the industrial/commercial loans, loans to individuals and the
loans to agriculture. The only other major lending sector is the real estate sector
which is not included in LTA, the reason for which will be outlined below.
• K is a measure of bank capital ratio. We will be working with two different
measures of capital ratios. First, we use the capital adequacy ratio which is the
Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital as a fraction of risk weighted assets. Second, we use the
Tier 1 ratio.
• BSC consists of lagged bank specific controls which include liquidity and log of
loan charge-offs.
• Macro controls for the state of the overall macroeconomy i.e. aggregate shocks.
We use the growth rate of real GDP as the control. Following the literature,
this also helps us account for demand side factors. We can thus exclusively
focus on a supply sided mechanism.
• αi and νs are the bank and state fixed effects respectively.
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3.4.1 Endogeneity Issues and IV Estimation
We are aware that the equation above suffers from a potential endogeneity problem.
The equation (3.1) above assumes that the bank sequentially decides first on how
much capital to hold and then how many loans to make. In practice, however, this
might not be a reasonable assumption. We think that such decisions are not sequen-
tial but simultaneous. Hence we find a suitable instrument for bank capital. Our
instrument is the banks’ exposure to the real estate sector. Our first stage regression
is the following:
Ki,t = α + θLTAR
s
i,t−1 ∗%∆LPt + controlsi,t−1 + vi,t (3.2)
Here,
• LTAR is the average loans made to the real estate sector over total assets in
the last three quarters. It measures the exposure of a bank to this particular
sector. The greater the exposure, the greater the change that the bank capital
will be sensitive to real estate price movements.
• LP is the real estate price index at the state level. We use the percentage
change in LP .
• controlsi,t−1 includes bank specific and macro controls as discussed earlier.
Here we instrument bank capital by the interaction between the change in real
estate prices and real estate exposure of the bank. If the real estate prices in a
particular state increase, then the impact on bank capital depends on the banks’
exposure to the real estate sector. If a bank has sufficient exposure to the real estate
market, a rise in land prices means that the value of its assets has risen and that in
turn means that the bank now has greater equity, assuming that liabilities remains
roughly unchanged. On the other hand, if the bank has limited exposure to the real
estate sector, this appreciation in land prices will have a much more subdued impact
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on its capital. We report the regression results later to prove the validity of the
instrument but it is clear that our instrument is correlated with the bank capital and
uncorrelated with the error because our dependent variable is the loans made to all
sectors except the real estate sector. This is not correlated with land price movements
or loans made to real estate in the last three quarters.
3.5 Regression Analysis
We report the fixed effects instrumental variable estimation results of the model. We
also report the first stage regression results in the IV estimation.
Table 3.2 shows the first results for the impact of bank capital on lending. This
is the baseline specification and we add controls sequentially here. Columns (1)-
(4) use the capital adequacy ratio as the measure of capital while columns (5)-(8)
use the tier 1 capital ratio. Columns (1) and (5) include no additional controls in
the regression. The magnitude of β is significant at the 1% level. We see that on
introducing controls, the coefficient remains significant at the 1% level.4 The baseline
results show a subdued impact of bank capital on lending. A 1% point increase in the
CAR leads to an increase in the loan to asset ratio in the range of 0.04% and 0.08%.
We think that is quite a small impact given that a 1% point increase in the capital
adequacy ratio is quite a substantial increase.
Table 3.3 shows the results of our main IV estimation. The dependent variable is
still the loan to asset ratio where the loans exclude those made to real estate sector.
The first two columns show results from our entire sample which is all commercial
banks except the top and bottom decile. The next two columns show results from
banks above the median and the last two columns show results for banks which
are below the median. We also use the two measures of capital for each of the
three samples. We include state fixed effects in the regression to capture within state
4We use lagged liquidity and charge-offs as bank specific controls and lagged GDP growth as the
macro control variable.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LTANR LTANR LTANR LTANR LTANR LTANR LTANR LTANR
VARIABLES CAR CAR CAR CAR T1 Cap T1 Cap T1 Cap T1 Cap
Capital 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.064*** 0.080*** 0.236*** 0.053*** 0.125*** 0.141***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.012) (0.037) (0.003) (0.018) (0.025)
L.logcharge -0.583*** -0.897*** -1.064*** -0.180*** -0.224*** -0.227***
(0.030) (0.085) (0.137) (0.007) (0.019) (0.022)
L.liqui 0.001 0.001* 0.012*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
L.growth -0.898*** -0.465***
(0.189) (0.154)
Observations 343,752 143,580 126,382 126,382 343,752 143,580 126,382 126,382
Number of id 9,027 6,882 6,735 6,735 9,027 6,882 6,735 6,735
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.2: IV Regression (Adding Controls Sequentially)
changes. We also include lagged macroeconomic and bank specific controls. However,
before we discuss the results listed in this table, perhaps we should briefly comment
on the first stage regression which is the direct estimation of equation (3.2). The
results are shown in Table 3.4. We use the percentage change in real estate prices
times the three quarter average of real estate loan to asset ratio as the instrument.
The two columns predict the CAR and the tier 1 capital respectively. The sign on the
instrument is positive and significant at the 1% level, which means that with a rise in
asset values, bank capital increases, assuming that liabilities are roughly unchanged.
Now let us look at Table 3.3 in detail. The coefficient on the capital ratio re-
mains positive and significant at the 1% confidence level, mostly. We find a moderate
response of lending to bank capital. As discussed earlier, the magnitudes are much
smaller than those suggested by Adrian and Shin (2007) but are in agreement with
other papers that use US data and where the sample period starts after the intro-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LTANR LTANR LTANR LTANR LTANR LTANR
CAR T1 Cap CAR T1 Cap CAR T1 Cap
VARIABLES All All Big Big Small Small
Capital 0.080*** 0.141*** 0.135*** 0.346 0.050*** 0.077***
(0.012) (0.025) (0.048) (0.226) (0.006) (0.010)
L.logcharge -1.064*** -0.227*** -1.630*** -0.206*** -0.752*** -0.229***
(0.137) (0.022) (0.536) (0.073) (0.079) (0.016)
L.liqui 0.001* 0.014*** 0.001 0.034 0.002** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001)
L.growth -0.898*** -0.465*** -2.061** -1.797 -0.292*** -0.035
(0.189) (0.154) (0.836) (1.363) (0.106) (0.077)
Observations 126,382 126,382 66,222 66,222 60,160 60,160
Number of id 6,735 6,735 3,343 3,343 3,392 3,392
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.3: Main IV Regression
duction of the Basel Banking Accord in 1989. The other thing to note is that the
effect of capital on lending is bigger for the relatively bigger banks. The reason could
be as follows. The bigger a bank gets and the more capital it has, the more loans
it can make, as compared to a smaller bank. Bigger banks tend to enjoy greater
access to financial markets and government guarantees than smaller banks. Hence
their LTA responds more to capital than their smaller counterparts. For the whole
sample, we find that a 1% increase in capital leads to an increase in the LTA which
ranges between 0.08% and 0.14% depending on what measure of capital we use. For
the sample above the median, the results are a bit mixed. This shows the effect of
0.13% for CAR and we lose significance when we use the tier 1 ratio. For the smaller
banks, the range is between 0.05% and 0.07%. Berropside and Edge (2010) do not
consider separate studies for the different groups of banks as we do but by using bank
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(1) (2)
CAR T1 Cap
VARIABLES All All
LTAR*%∆ LP 5.740*** 3.258***
(1.487) (1.086)
L.logcharge 11.438*** 0.537**
(0.509) (0.250)
L.liqui -0.059*** -0.123***
(0.008) (0.006)
L.growth 14.924*** 5.394***
(1.077) (0.662)
Constant 14.775*** 10.913***
(0.127) (0.062)
Observations 126,467 126,467
Number of id 6,820 6,820
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: First Stage Regression
holding company data, they also suggest a low impact of bank capital on lending.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper seeks to quantify the impact of bank capital ratios on lending as this is
one of the key policy questions when analyzing financial-real sector linkages. Using a
subset of the commercial banks in the United States and an innovative instrumenting
strategy, we find a modest impact of bank equity on lending behavior. Our estimates
are broadly consistent with other recent studies in the literature that have worked
on US data. Some earlier papers do report much higher estimates but they do not
account for the structural change in the banking sector following the introduction of
the Basel Core Banking Principles.
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Appendix A
Nash Wage Bargaining
Let HN,t and HU,t be the value of an additional unemployed and unemployed worker
to the household, respectively:
HN,t = ψ + u′(ct)wt + βEt [(1− ρx + ρxf(θt+1))HU,t+1 + ρx(1− f(θt+1))HN,t+1](A.1)
HU,t = u′(ct)s+ βEt [f(θt+1)HN,t+1 + (1− f(θt+1))HU,t+1] (A.2)
The household’s marginal surplus of a match is defined as:
Ht = HN,t −HU,t
u′(ct)
= −ψ
u′(ct)
+ wt − s+ (1− ρx)EtΛt+1|t(1− f(θt+1))Ht+1 (A.3)
Similarly, the value of an additional employed worker to the firm Jt can be written
as:
Jt = (1− α)zt(kt/nt)α − χtwt + (1− ρx)γEtΛt+1|tJt+1 (A.4)
The Nash wage bargaining outcome maximizes the weighted average of the surplus
from a job match
max
wt
H1−ηt J ηt
where η is the bargaining power of workers. The solution to this problem is given by
η˜Jt = (1− η˜)Ht (A.5)
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where η˜ = η
η+(1−η)χt . After rearranging terms the joint surplust of the match St is:
St = Jt +Ht (A.6)
= (1− α)zt(kt/nt)α + (1− χt)wt −
(
ψ
u′(ct)
+ s
)
+ (1− ρx)γEtΛt+1|tJt+1
+(1− ρx)EtΛt+1|t(1− f(θt+1)) η˜t1− η˜tJt+1 (A.7)
Rearranging terms using (A.6) and (A.7) and substituting with (1.13), the Nash
bargained wage can be expressed as
wt =
η
χt
[
(1− α)zt
(
kt
nt
)α
+ (1− ρx)γEtΛt+1|t%
′(vt+1)χt+1
q(θt+1)
]
+ (1− η)
[
φ
u′(ct)
+ s
]
− η
χt
(1− ρx)
[
EtΛt+1|t (1− p(θt+1)) %
′(vt+1)χt+1
q(θt+1)
]
(A.8)
which corresponds to the wage equation (1.25) in the main text.
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Appendix B
Data Description and Regression Tables
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Figure B.1: Distributions of the Capital Adequacy Ratio
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Tier 1 Ratio
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Tier 1 Ratio
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
.05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Tier 1 Ratio
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Tier 1 Ratio
Figure B.2: Distributions of the Tier 1 Capital Ratio
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Figure B.3: Distribution of the Equity-to-Asset Ratio
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Figure B.4: Time Series of Key Variables (1)
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